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 Zoning is an integral part of nearly every American community. The main purpose of 
zoning regulation is to promote orderly community development. Zoning accomplishes this 
purpose by imposing a variety of restrictions on location, size, and types of land use. Continued 
population growth and urban development have made zoning essential to balance public and 
private property interests.1 Communities adopt growth limits from a variety of motives. Such 
incentives may include conservationists genuinely interested to preserve general or specif ic 
environments, social exclusionism, racial exclusion, racial discrimination, income segregation, 
fiscal protection, or just fear of any future change; each of these are purposes well served by growth 
prevention. Whatever the motivation, total exclusion of people from a community is both immoral 
and illegal. 2 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 (also commonly known as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, hereinafter the “Act”) had aimed to remediate race-based housing exclusion.3 However, 
it did not address economic discrimination in housing.4  Because people of color are 
disproportionately low-income, economic segregation achieves many of the same outcomes as 
explicit race-based exclusion.5  Such de facto segregation is no better for its targets than purposeful 
 
1 24 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts 543 (Originally published in 1994). 
2 Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976). 
3 THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1968); See also Paula A. Franzese & Stephanie J. Beach, 
Promises Still to Keep: The Fair Housing Act Fifty Years Later, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1207 (2019) (noting that the 
Fair Housing Act “aimed to undo the shameful legacy of de jure and de facto race -based housing discrimination”).  
4Elizabeth Winkler, ‘Snob Zoning’ is Racial Housing Segregation by Another Name , WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/25/snobzoning-is-racial-housing-
segregation-by-another-name/?utm_term=.4174ba73b19f  (“There is no class-based version of the Fair Housing 
Act—that is, no federal legislation that says economic exclusion is improper.”). 





de jure segregation.6  The impact has been devastating for generations of minorities who were 
denied the right to live where they wanted to live, and raise and school their children where they 
could flourish most successfully —leading to the powder keg that has defined Ferguson, 
Baltimore, Charleston, and Chicago. 
In response to the Act, in the early 1970s the courts were moving rapidly towards a major 
reversal in the law on exclusionary zoning directed against lower-income groups, and the 
promotion of affordable housing.7 The three big Middle Atlantic states—New York, New Jersey, 
and Pennsylvania, took the lead on this.  Their approach culminated in the Mount Laurel doctrine, 
while other areas of the country have implemented alternative solutions. 
 The Mount Laurel doctrine8, a legal principle set forth in a series of New Jersey Supreme 
Court rulings, is among the most significant contributions ever made to the advancement of 
affordable housing. In these rulings, the New Jersey Supreme Court implicitly declared housing to 
be a fundamental right9 and imposed an affirmative obligation on municipalities to provide a 
 
6 Paula A. Franzese & Stephanie J. Beach, Promises Still to Keep: The Fair Housing Act Fifty Years Later, 40 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2019) 
7 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1 (Rev. Ed.). 
8The Mount Laurel doctrine emanates from a series of cases: S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel I”]; S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 
390 (N.J. 1983) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel II”]; Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Twp. in Somerset Cnty., 510 A.2d 621 
(N.J. 1986) [hereinafter “Mount Laurel III”]; and In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 ex rel. New Jersey Council 
on Affordable Housing, 110 A.3d 31 (N.J. 2015), [hereinafter “Mount Laurel IV”] (collectively “Mount Laurel”). 
9 See generally John M. Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of  Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 555 (2000) (Mount Laurel II court effectively declares a constitutional right to shelter under the New Jersey 
Constitution). However, the Mount Laurel court could not point to any specific provision in the state constitution to 
support a finding that there is a constitutional right to affordable housing. Id. at 564–65. In notable contrast, 
however, in the same year, the same justices concluded a specific provision within the New Jersey Constitution 
supported a finding of a constitutionally protected right to a “thorough and efficient” education. See Robinson v. 




“realistic opportunity” 10 for a fair share of the state’s need for affordable housing.11 In doing so, 
the court recognized poverty as a factor in the constitutional inquiry.12 In effect, the court went 
beyond what any state or federal court had done prior to 1975 or has done since in this area of the 
law.  
 Nevertheless, municipalities have strong incentives to resist the construction of affordable 
housing in their jurisdictions. Critics view the Mount Laurel doctrine as contradictory to sound 
planning principals, a catalyst for urban sprawl, environmentally precarious, and financially 
burdensome to ill-equipped local budgets.13 Thus, for years, powerful forces within the state kept 
New Jersey from making progress in the fight to address the affordable-housing crisis, claiming 
that expanding opportunities for low-income families and breaking down barriers of racial 
exclusion would somehow hurt middle-class families.14 Instead, we are learning that our 
communities thrive when we redevelop blighted office parks and empty strip malls into spirited 
 
10 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 724–25. By use of the phrase “realistic opportunity,” the court did not impose on 
municipalities an obligation to provide a fair share of housing, but to create the opportun ity to do so. Payne’s article 
emphasizes that the effect of these words is to make the doctrine less strict or harsh, and other scholars have written 
on the subject as well. The language is also supported by its repeated use in Mount Laurel II. See, e.g., Mount Laurel 
II, 456 A.2d at 442 (“Once a municipality has revised its land use regulations and taken other steps affirmatively to 
provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of lower income housing, the Mount Laurel 
doctrine requires it to do no more.”).  
11 Id. However, the Court makes it clear that it does not intend to prescribe remedies to effectuate its bold ruling, and 
that the mandate would not affirmatively require suburban municipalities to produce affordable housing. See, e.g., 
Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 442 (“Once a municipality has revised its land use regulations and taken other steps 
affirmatively to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of lower income housing, the 
Mount Laurel doctrine requires it to do no more.”). 
12 Robert C. Holmes, The Clash of Home Rule and Affordable Housing: The Mount Laurel Story Continues , 12 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 325, 326 (2013) (Recognition of poverty as a relevant consideration in the inquiry regarding 
Mount Laurel compliance does not necessarily raise poverty to a protected class, but only to a relevant consideration  
in determining whether the realistic opportunity test has been met). 
13 See DANIEL CARLSON & SHASHIR MATHUR, Does Growth Management Aid or Thwart the Provision of Affordable 
Housing? GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 20, 45-46  (Anthony Downs 
ed., 2004) (stating that, “There is a widespread public perception that the state’s affordable housing policy is a cause 
of urban sprawl”). 





mixed-use communities that reduce sprawl and increase affordability with diverse housing options 
that include apartments and starter homes.15   
 Part I of this paper will discuss the systematic segregation in housing that led to the Fair 
Housing Act and Mount Laurel doctrine.  Part II will lay out the development and execution of the 
Mount Laurel doctrine, beginning with Mount Laurel I viewed through the lens that economic 
exclusion is racial exclusion. Part III will then examine the benefits and burdens of two separate 
approaches to compliance.  On one hand, a legislative scheme that sets up an executive agency 
which allows municipalities to decide how and where to permit construction of affordable housing 
within their boundaries, versus a judicial scheme that for all intents and purposes allows courts to 
decide how and where affordable housing will be built within a municipality.   
II. PART ONE  
 
In New Jersey, the exclusionary zoning tradition developed in the 1950s and early 1960s 
relied upon several propositions.  First, that the statutory power to zone for the “general welfare” 
grants municipalities with broad powers to control land use to achieve a variety of objectives; and 
this power should be interpreted as referring to the welfare of each municipality as a separate 
unit.16 It was also established that “fiscal zoning,” to improve a municipality's position on tax 
ratables, is an appropriate goal under this police-power action.17 Further, that “the vague phrases 
deriving from the end of Section 3 of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act—conservation of property 
 
15 Douglas Massey, Learning from Mount Laurel, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 10, 2012), 
shelterforce.org/2012/10/10/learning_from_mount_laurel/ (finding that Mount Laurel's Ethel Lawrence homes were 
an “unequivocal success”). 
16 An affirmative (and negative) municipal duty on access to housing—In New Jersey—The exclusionary tradition, 3 





values, taking into consideration the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for 
particular uses, and encouraging the most appropriate use of land—represent a separate and 
additional grant of municipal power, and serve to justify exclusionary zoning.”18 Finally, the 
traditional zoning also relied upon a concept of “balanced zoning”—which, in practice, turns out 
to eliminate multiple dwellings.19  
As zoning laws first developed, New Jersey courts upheld a broad range of potentially 
exclusionary techniques and ordinances.  These decisions include prohibitions against any 
apartment buildings in practically an entire community,20 against increasing the number of 
dwelling units in apartments above about 10% of the total,21 against any small houses,22 against 
homes on less than five-acre lots in most of a township,23 and even against any mobile homes.24 
These opinions upheld backward-looking principles under the traditional concept of “balanced 
zoning.”  
However, in the last of these cases (involving mobile homes) Justice Frederick Hall wrote 
a dissent focused upon the development of the prohibitive tradition that had become suburban 
exclusionary zoning.25 His dissent is widely regarded as the best of modern zoning opinions.26   In 




20 Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super. 405 (App. Div. 1951). 
21 Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320 (1958). 
22 Lionshead Lake v. Wayne Twp., Passaic County, 10 N.J. 165 (1952). 
23 Fischer v. Bedminster Twp., 11 N.J. 194 (1952). 
24 Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Twp ., 181 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1962) (overruled by, Mount Laurel II) 
(the Southern Burlington court rendered absolute bans of mobile homes no longer permissible on grounds of adverse 
effect on real estate values). 
25 See id.; An affirmative (and negative) municipal duty on access to housing—In New Jersey—The Vickers dissent, 
3 AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 68:5 (Rev. Ed.). 




municipalities and opened the door for the municipalities to use their zoning powers for aims 
beyond its legitimate purposes.27  He reasoned that  
[L]egitimate use of the zoning power by such municipalities does not encompass 
the right to erect barricades on their boundaries through exclusion or too tight 
restriction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared disruption with a so-
called chosen way of life…[n]or does it encompass provisions designed to let in as 
new residents only certain kinds of people, or those who can afford to live in 
favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of present property owners.28  
Justice Hall further cautioned “[t]he majority's view could as well support exclusion of modernistic 
dwelling architecture, split level homes, or even whole developments of identical houses if a bare 
majority of the township committee does not like their looks.”29 
 Shortly thereafter, the winds began to shift. In 1973 a Rhode Island court noted that the 
test used to determine whether an ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the police power is whether 
there exists a reasonable relationship between the ordinance and protecting the public health, 
safety, morals and welfare - and held that restrictions intended to protect the community's tax base 
were improper.30 Then, in 1975, in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, the New York Court of 
Appeals announced a two-part test for municipal zoning ordinances challenged as being 
exclusionary.31 The court held that a proper ordinance should: (1) provide for a “balanced [and] 
cohesive community;” and (2) take into consideration regional, as well as local, housing needs.32 
 
27 Vickers, 181 A.2d at 140-41.    
28 Id.   
29 Id.   
30 Town of Glocester v. Olivo's Mobile Home Court, Inc., 300 A.2d 465 (R.I. 1973). 





Nevertheless, the court qualified the latter requirement by holding that a municipality need not 
meet a “fair share” standard when the regional need for low and moderate-income housing is 
satisfied elsewhere.33  
Other major states, including California, joined New York in endorsing this “regional 
general welfare” approach.34 States like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Illinois, no longer permitted 
municipalities to exclude multifamily housing completely and required that they provide for their 
“fair share” of various housing types.35  Meanwhile, Massachusetts continued to implement (and 
support) its “antisnob-zoning” law.36  While courts in Connecticut and Maine suggested the 
exclusionary problem may have to be addressed, though not going so far as to overturn any 
ordinances.37 Surely, the Justices sitting on the Supreme Court of New Jersey were aware of this 
turning tide when they sat to hear and decide Mount Laurel at this kairotic moment in our history.  
The development of public policy in other critical areas also cast considerable light on the 
implications of the exclusionary suburban pattern.38 Indeed, “the Mount Laurel saga resembles, at 
least in form, a more prominent line of constitutional decisions.”39 In Brown v. Board of Education 
(hereinafter “Brown I”), the United States Supreme Court held that racial segregation deprived 
 
33 Id. at 242-43. 
34 Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 473. 
35 Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975); Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 302 
N.W.2d 146 (Mich. 1981); Oak Park Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of Palos Park, Cook Cty., 435 N.E.2d 1265 (Ill. App. 
1982). 
36 MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 40B (West 2020); 760 MASS. CODE REGS. 56.01 (West 2020). Chapter 40B permits a city 
or town to plan jointly with other cities or towns to promote development and prosperity within their area. §§ 20 
through 23 of Chapter 40B specifically deal with affordable housing, while 760 CMR 56.00 has further advanced 
the statutory purposes of M.G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20 through 23 by clarifying the procedures of the expedited review 
process, and by otherwise addressing recurring questions of interpretation  
37 Zelvin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Windsor, 306 A.2d 151 (C.P. 1973); Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of 
Appeals of Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741 (Me. 1974). 
38 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1.  
39 Joseph Marsico, A Forty-Year Failure: Why the New Jersey Supreme Court Should Take Control of Mount Laurel 




schoolchildren of their constitutional equal protection rights.40 A subsequent Brown v. Board of 
Education case (hereinafter “Brown II”) remanded each of the consolidated Brown I cases to their 
respective District Courts and directed the courts “to take such [action] as [is] necessary and proper 
to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties 
to these cases.”41 As the arduous process of school desegregation progressed, it became 
increasingly obvious that in many areas the primary cause for school segregation is simply the 
pattern of segregated occupancy of housing.  After all, a segregated residential area, whether no 
matter the demographic, is likely to have a segregated school, unless major efforts are made to 
prevent this.42 
Certainly, the Brown decisions were a recent example of the judiciary recognizing an acute 
injustice and constructing a remedy where the political branches had failed ; they were 
groundbreaking and the aftereffects were still newsworthy and relevant. For the veteran jurists 
tasked to decide Mount Laurel I, Brown could not have been far from mind.43 The same justices 
were also in that same year hearing Robinson v. Cahill, a case which mingled the state tax 
uniformity clause and the federal equal protection clause, ultimately declaring the system of 
financing public schools to be unconstitutional.44   
In both Brown and Mount Laurel, the courts heard complaints by minority groups alleging 
that government actors had violated their rights. The courts broke ground by recognizing 
“fundamental rights” that had not been previously observed. Yet both decisions were politically 
 
40 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
41 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
42 Introduction, 3 American Land Planning Law § 68:1. 
43 See Holmes, supra, note 12 at 347 (“A case likely in the minds of the Mount Laurel court is Brown v. Bd. of 
Education. The court also likely considered familiar adages associated with social change: that rules are not self -
executing and that a rule change is no good without a political base to support it.” (citations omitted)). 




unpopular in most sectors, and enforcement was neither straightforward nor effortless and took 
time to achieve.45 Finally, in both cases, the respective legislatures eventually lent their support by 
passing statutes to foster compliance: Congress with its Civil Rights Act 46 to, inter alia, promote 
integration, and the New Jersey Legislature with its Fair Housing Act47 to streamline and formalize 
the affordable housing mission. Thus, it is reasonable to note that there is a parallel between the 
Brown cases and the Mount Laurel cases. 
III. PART II 
 
During the 1960s, a social movement to end institutionalized racial discrimination, 
disenfranchisement and racial segregation was growing throughout the United States.  Moderates 
in the movement worked with the United States Congress to achieve the passage of several 
significant pieces of federal legislation that overturned discriminatory laws and practices, 
authorizing oversight and enforcement by the federal government. As a result, the separate but 
equal policy, which aided the enforcement of Jim Crow laws, was substantially weakened and 
eventually dismantled.  At the same time, two major development strategies were taking place in 
the Mount Laurel region, one in the City of Camden, and the other in its developing suburbs, 
including Mount Laurel Township in Burlington County.  
In Camden, the policy-makers were trying to utilize urban renewal and highway 
construction to rebuild the city. The result was just the opposite: the city’s middle-class residents, 
 
45 Arguably, the actualization of both efforts is intertwined, and the aims of neither decision have been realized to 
date, but that is beyond the scope of this note.   
46CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1964). 




mostly white, left the city for the suburbs, and the poor, financially unable to move out, were 
displaced by the government action, “relocated” from one slum to the next and sentenced to reside 
in substandard, overpriced housing which became the worst urban ghetto in America.48 Their goal 
was to escape Camden to the decent housing, safe neighborhoods, good schools and employment 
in the developing suburbs.49 
In Mount Laurel Township, development plans were underway. Three “Planned Unit 
Developments” (hereinafter “PUDs”), were intended to develop more than 10,000 homes, 
industrial parks and commercial centers.50  The result would transform Mount Laurel from 
farmland to an affluent suburb. Not even one unit of affordable housing was part of these planned 
developments.51 Mount Laurel’s plans were fiscal zoning at its best, aimed at attracting the highest 
tax ratables.52 Zoning regulations such as the ones in place create barriers to inclusion by imposing 
minimum lot size requirements, requiring aesthetic uniformity, and forbidding builders from 
developing apartment buildings or townhouses in certain areas, thereby assuring access only to 
those of certain financial means, which translates to excluding the poor.53 
Contrasted with this massive development scheme was Mount Laurel’s historic black 
community, which had resided in the Township since the Revolutionary War. These families 
worked the farms and were of modest means, incomes much below what would be needed to 
 
48 E.g. Top 100 Most Dangerous Cities in the U.S., NEIGHBORHOODSCOUT, 
https://www.neighborhoodscout.com/blog/top100dangerous (last visited January 3, 2021) (Ca mden has appeared in 
the top ten on this list every year since the lists inception); 10 Most Dangerous U.S. Cities, AMERICAN CITY AND 
COUNTY, https://www.americancityandcounty.com/galleries/2020s-10-most-dangerous-u-s-cities/ (last visited 
January 3, 2021).  
49 Fair Share Housing Center, What is the Mount Laurel Doctrine? , WWW.FAIRSHAREHOUSING.COM, 




53 Richard D. Kahlenberg, AN ECONOMIC FAIR HOUSING ACT, REPORT RACE & INEQUALITY at 3-4 (2017), 




purchase one of the new single-family homes planned for Mount Laurel’s three PUDs.54 This is 
how entrenched race-based class differences allow economic exclusion to continue “racial 
segregation’s ugly work.”55 Because people of color remain of disproportionately lower income 
than whites, the absence of affordable housing in more expensive cities and towns achieves many 
of the same results as explicit racial zoning.56 
While the PUD plans were undergoing the municipal approval process, Mount Laurel 
Township stepped up its code enforcement efforts in order to remove its black residents who were 
often residing in substandard, dilapidated housing, some of which were “living” in converted 
chicken coops.57 As these properties were condemned, the Township ordered the occupants to 
vacate. No relocation, as required by state law, was offered to these families.58 The goal was to get 
them out of the Township in order to enhance the PUD marketing plan to “attract predominantly 
upper middle-class families and first-class commercial and industrial rateables.”59 Unfortunately, 
this type of economic exclusion assures that whole swaths of the working poor and middle class 
are unable even to live in convenient proximity to their places of work. 60 
Mount Laurel’s longtime black community, facing the prospect of being forced out of the 
only community they had ever known, began to organize.61 Ethel R. Lawrence, a daycare teacher, 
 
54 Fair Share Housing Center, supra note 49. 
55 See Kimberly Quick, Exclusionary Zoning Continues Racial Segregation’s Ugly Work, CENTURY FOUND (last 
visited December 4, 2020), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/exclusionary-zoningcontinues-racial-segregations-
ugly-work/?agreed=1.  
56 Kahlenberg, supra note 102, at 6. 
57 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 714. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 See Alana Semuels, The Barriers Stopping Poor People from Moving to Better Jobs, ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/geographicmobility -and-housing/542439 (last visited January 
7, 2021); see also Emily Dreyfuss, The Year in Housing: The Middle Class Can’t Afford to Live in Cities Anymore , 
WIRED (Dec. 31, 2020, https://www.wired.com/2016/12/year-housing-middle-class-cant-afford-livecities-anymore/. 




wife, mother of nine, church leader and member of the Burlington County Community Action 
program (“B.C.C.A.P.”, the anti-poverty program), organized an effort in November 1969 to 
petition Mount Laurel Township’s zoning board to permit the development of thirty affordable 
garden apartments by a non-profit group.62 This proposal would create relocation housing within 
the Township for displaced families. Mount Laurel Township officials doggedly opposed the 
proposal, and resulted in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel 
(Mount Laurel I).63 
In Mount Laurel I, the justices determined that Mount Laurel Township’s zoning ordinance 
was invalid because it unlawfully excluded low and moderate-income families from the 
municipality.64 The justices reasoned that the state could only exercise its police power 65 (for 
example, the power to regulate land use through zoning ordinances) to promote public health, 
safety, morals, or the general welfare.66 The justices also stated that all police power enactments, 
whether state or local enactments, must conform to the basic state constitutional requirements of 
substantive due process and equal protection.67 Accordingly, the Mount Laurel I court determined 
that because all local power to zone comes from the State Enabling Act, and the state delegates the 
power to municipalities, the police power must reflect the general welfare of the state as a whole, 
and is thus not limited to the municipality itself.68 Thus, the definition of “general welfare” must 
 
62 Fair Share Housing Center, supra note 49. 
63 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 713. 
64 Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 731.  
65 See generally Mount Laurel I, 336 A. 2d 713. The police power as used herein does not refer to law enforcement, 
but to the fundamental power vested in states to govern, including making and enforcing laws. Controlled by state 
constitutions and other limitations, such as due process, this power must be exercised for the protection and 
preservation of public health, justice, morals, order, safety, and the general welfare of the state's inhabitants. Police 
power can be delegated to local units of government. (quotations omitted). 






include the welfare of those outside the municipal borders as well as those inside.69 Furthermore, 
the court determined that the provision of adequate housing for low and moderate-income citizens 
is an “absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use 
regulation.”70 Thereafter, having invalidated Mount Laurel Township’s exclusionary zoning 
ordinance, the court went on to make the Mount Laurel doctrine applicable to all of the state’s 
municipalities.71 However, while Mount Laurel I sought to resolve the problems of exclusion by 
requiring that each developing community make possible the development of its fair share of the 
regional need for affordable housing ‒through its land use controls‒ it actually complicated them 
through the failure to specify the remedial obligation and the definitions established. 
Thus, the decision was essentially impotent.72 Many towns openly refused to enforce it, 
and even Mount Laurel itself refused to implement the doctrine bearing its name, and so the matter 
reappeared before the Supreme Court of New Jersey almost ten years later.73 At that time, the court 
observed:  
After all this time, ten years after the trial court’s initial order invalidating its 
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly 
exclusionary ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired 
experts, the ordinance at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel’s 
determination to exclude the poor. Mount Laurel is not alone; we believe that 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 727. 
71 See, e.g., Id. at 728 (“It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such 
municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an 
appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet  the needs, 
desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries.”); See also Holmes, 
supra, note 12 at 360.   
72 See, e.g., Henry L. Kent-Smith, The Council on Affordable Housing and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will  the 
Council Succeed?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987) (arguing that Mount Laurel I failed to produce low cost 
housing); Paula A. Franzese, Mount Laurel III: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat , 18 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 30, 32 (1988) (arguing tha t little had changed in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel 
II); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay , 15 N.J. REP. 4, 21 (1985) (noting that eight 
years after Mount Laurel I no affordable housing had yet been built in Mount Laurel Township). 




there is widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate of our 
original opinion in this case.74  
 
With Mount Laurel II, the Supreme Court of New Jersey resolved that “[t]o the best of our 
ability, we shall not allow [this delay] to continue.”75 The court was “more firmly committed to 
the original Mount Laurel I doctrine than ever, and [it was] determined, within appropriate judicial 
bounds, to make it work.”76 This time, the court increased the obligation to actually make 
affordable housing available either through use of mobile homes, subsidies, development 
incentives such as density bonuses, tax incentives, and conceivably rent skewing, where the 
subsidy for affordable units of housing was supplied by raising the price of unsubsidized units 
within a development, or by the mandatory set-aside of a percentage of units in new developments 
for affordable housing.77  
Further, Mount Laurel II made the doctrine enforceable by giving developers an incentive 
to initiate exclusionary zoning suits.78 This incentive came to be known as the “builder’s 
remedy.”79 When a builder proposes a development that includes affordable housing and a 
municipality denies the proposal for violating local zoning codes, the developer may challenge the 
denial in court, asserting that the municipality has not complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.80 





77 Id. at 419. 
78 Id. at 418, 429-30. 
79 Id. at 418, 452-53. 
80 Id. 
81 New Jersey—Mount Laurel doctrine, 2 RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 22:17 (4th ed.) 
(Determination of a municipality's fair share of regional lower income housing needs will be made by one of three 
trial judges selected by the chief justice and approved by the full court. It is expected th at the use of specially 
designated judges will help to ensure consistency and predictability of rules, and will allow the selected judges to 




planning agency's definition of region and “fair share” (the amount of affordable housing each 
New Jersey municipality was required to provide to comply with the Mount Laurel doctrine) be 
utilized.82 If a court determines that the municipality has not complied, the court may permit the 
developer to construct the project despite violations to the local zoning code and invalidate the 
offending zoning provision for excluding affordable housing.83  
After Mount Laurel I, constitutional compliance was at the discretion of each town.  Now, 
the courts themselves became an effective enforcement instrument, supplying a “special litigation 
track for exclusionary zoning cases and . . . a ‘builder’s remedy’ by which builders could file suit 
for the opportunity to construct housing at higher densities than a municipality otherwise would 
allow.”84 The court had “learned from experience . . . that unless a strong judicial hand is used, 
Mount Laurel will not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.”85  
Nonetheless, the flood of “builder’s remedy” litigation that followed Mount Laurel II 
triggered a movement to get the courts out of the practice of land use planning and eventually 
caused the New Jersey State Legislature to pass the Fair Housing Act of 1985.86 The main purpose 
of the Act was to reassess the fair share allocations assigned to the affected communities, to get 
these communities out of court, and to provide a funding mechanism so that low- and moderate-
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municipality has failed to meet its Mount Laurel obligation, the court would order the town to 
revise its ordinance in 90 days. 88 
New Jersey’s Fair Housing Act in turn created a state agency to promulgate guidelines and 
oversee administration, the Council on Affordable Housing (hereinafter “COAH”).89  COAH was 
now responsible for determining the municipalities’ “fair share.”90 COAH would be required to: 
(1) enact regulations that establish and update statewide affordable housing need; (2) assign each 
municipality an affordable housing obligation for its designated region; and (3) identify the 
delivery techniques available to municipalities in addressing the assigned obligation.91 Further, the 
Fair Housing Act permitted municipalities to seek certification from COAH to show that they had 
substantially complied with the Mount Laurel doctrine.92 Participating municipalities would file a 
Fair Share Housing Plan with COAH, and this process insulated the municipality from builders’ 
remedy suits.93 
The “builder's remedy” available under the Mount Laurel doctrine was initially available 
in limited circumstances after the creation of COAH, but was later eliminated under COAH's 
regulations if a municipality's fair share plan remained in effect.94 The Fair Housing Act also 
permitted communities to transfer their cases to a nine-member Council on Affordable Housing.95 
Trial courts hearing Mount Laurel cases not transferred to the Council on Affordable Housing 
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must nevertheless use the fair share methodology employed by the Council unless found arbitrary 
and capricious; and only the Appellate Division had the power to invalidate the regulations.96  
In Mount Laurel III, numerous municipalities challenged the Act’s constitutionality under 
the Mount Laurel mandate.   Despite criticism that the new Act institutionalized delay and did not 
provide enough recourse, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act.97 
While recognizing that the attack on the statute was substantial, the court dismissed it as pure 
speculation, and conveyed its preference for legislative action.98 The court supported the 
Legislature’s intent to move affordable housing issues away from the judiciary, however, the court 
cautioned that it remained firmly committed to the original Mount Laurel I doctrine, and would 
not hesitate to intervene should it become clear that the legislature could not deliver.99  
The new enforcements of the doctrine had some success.100 Reports indicate that 95% of 
participants that moved ended up in a community with higher median income than where they 
lived prior to moving to their current housing but that moves to COAH-generated housing tended 
to concentrate participating households, with 41% of all movers concentrated in just five 
municipalities.101 Surveys of those who moved indicated that respondents were far more likely to 
report being better off financially in their new community than where they lived previously, but 
“given that access to employment has been a consistent focal point of debates around COAH and 
 
96 Bi-County Development Corp. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oakland, 224 N.J. Super. 455, 540 A.2d 927 
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97 Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d 621 at 632; Henry L. Kent-Smith, supra, note 57, at 945; see also Paula A. Franzese, 
supra note 76 at 40. 
98 Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 643; Kent-Smith, supra, note 76; see also Franzese, supra, note 76.  
99 Mount Laurel III, 510 A.2d at 633, 654-55. “If . . . the Act . . . achieves nothing but delay, the judiciary will be 
forced to resume its appropriate role.” “[n]o one should assume that our exercise of comity today signals a 
weakening of our resolve to enforce the constitutional rights of New Jersey’s lower income citizens.”  
100 Peter Buchsbaum, Mount Laurel II: A Ten Year Retrospective, ST. & LOC. L. NEWS, at 7, 17 (Winter 1994) 
(noting that without judicial pressure in Mount Laurel, the New Jersey legislature would not have enacted the Fair 
Housing Act, and 13,830 units of affordable housing were generated from litigation and legislation between 1987 –
1993).  
101 Bush-Baskette, Robinson and Simmons, Residential and Social Outcomes for Residents Living in Housing 




the Mount Laurel doctrine, it was unexpected to learn that most residents surveyed did not include 
access to employment as a motive for participation.”102 A large majority of respondents reported 
feeling very safe in their current residence, with approximately half of the residents reported 
feeling safer than in their prior location and only a very small percentage feeling less safe than 
previously.103  
Almost half of surveyed households that had children at home listed access to schools (or 
better schools) as one of their reasons for moving.104 A very large majority (85%) of these 
households with children reported that access to schools was “very good ,” and while most of these 
households with children reported that access to schools did not change when they moved, more 
than one-third (35%) of these households reported that access to schools improved and this was 
approximately four times the number of households that reported a decline in access (8%).105 
Additionally, by and large the residents surveyed reported having been able to maintain and extend 
their social networks, with 31% of households having more friends in their new community than 
in their prior one ‒a figure that tended to increase as residents lived in their new community for a 
longer period‒ and a large majority of residents surveyed reported that they were able to maintain 
contact with friends from their prior location 106This is despite the fact that more than one-third of 
residents report declining access to public transportation associated with their move to COAH 











A substantial majority of affordable housing residents surveyed tell us that: they 
like where they live; they like their housing units better than where they lived 
before; and, they like their new communities better than their old ones. Given the 
opportunity to move, a majority of respondents said they would prefer to stay where 
they are.108 
In 1987, the Council first adopted specific rules for determining a municipality’s affordable 
housing obligation, known as the First Round Rules.109 In 1993, the Second Round Rules were 
adopted, which were similar to the first, but took into account changes in census data. 110 The rules 
“applied a complex formula that took into account vacant land area, employment growth, and 
income distribution to come up with a firm, and sometimes seemingly highly arbitrary number for 
each municipality.”111 
When the time came to issue Third Round Rules, COAH changed the method of calculation 
to one which relied on a given municipalities “growth share,” a rehabilitation share, and any 
unsatisfied prior round obligations.112 The growth share tied affordable housing obligations to the 
net increase in the number of jobs and housing units a municipality would experience between 
2004 and 2014.113 This new methodology was highly criticized for deterring municipalities from 
expanding, since under the new regulations, housing obligations were determined by the amount 
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of homes and jobs created.114 Furthermore, while the criteria set out by COAH was inherently 
designed to address a municipality’s need for affordable housing; the rules had various “loopholes” 
that prevented inclusion.115  
Specifically, under the rules, municipalities could reduce the number of affordable housing 
units they were required to provide through the use of “credits.”116 In addition, up to twenty-five 
percent of a municipality’s required affordable housing could be satisfied through age-restrictive 
affordable housing.117 In other words, senior housing units could satisfy affordable housing, a 
circumstance that discriminates against low-income families with children118 Still, perhaps most 
devastatingly, “the FHA gave COAH discretion to approve townships' efforts to buy their way out 
of their Mount Laurel duty by transferring up to fifty percent of the given municipality's affordable 
housing obligation to a designated receiving municipality to use to build affordable housing within 
their borders.”119 These Regional Contribution Agreements (hereafter “RCA's”) frustrated the 
primary intention of economic integration and the creation of affordable housing opportunities in 
municipalities otherwise closed to whole segments of the population.120 Most often the receiving 
municipalities were found in older urban areas achieved the very opposite of the intended effect 
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of the Mount Laurel doctrine.121 Thus, the RCA’s enabled New Jersey to maintain existing 
segregation, utterly defeating the intent of the law.   
Finally, in 2007 developers and housing advocates, along with the New Jersey Builders 
Association, brought suit to invalidate the Third Round Rules.122 In In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 
5:94 & 5:95, the Appellate Division affirmed portions of COAH’s proposed methodology, but 
invalidated other aspects of the Third Round Rules.123  These invalidated aspects included the 
“growth share” principle, the RCA’s and other methods by which COAH reduced municipal 
housing obligations, on constitutional and other grounds.124 
Underscoring the political unpopularity of the doctrine, Gov. Chris Christie made 
abolishing COAH a central plank of his gubernatorial campaign in 2009.125 In 2011 Christie did 
just that, and abolished COAH by issuing a reorganization plan (hereinafter the “Plan”) that the 
Legislature could have blocked, but didn’t.126 Subsequently, on March 8, 2012, the Appellate 
Division invalidated the Plan after the Fair Share Housing Center challenged it in court.127  
Nonetheless, because COAH failed to successfully amend the Third Round Rules COAH 
remained unequipped to process municipalities' petitions for substantive certifications.128 
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Consequently, on March 10, 2015, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared COAH “moribund,” 
and once again transferred jurisdiction over Mount Laurel affordable housing issues to specially 
selected trial court judges in each vicinage.129  
In Mount Laurel IV, confronted by COAH's prolonged and ultimately unfruitful efforts to 
promulgate rules for assessing and identifying municipal compliance with housing obligations, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey (1) recognized COAH to be a nonfunctioning agency; (2) eliminated 
the FHA's exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement and reopened the courts to Mount 
Laurel litigants; and (3) provided a process by which a town might obtain the equivalent of 
substantive certification for its fair share housing plan and avoid exclusionary zoning actions, after 
a court assessed the town's fair share responsibility.130 Two years later the court re-affirmed the 
Mount Laurel IV takeover of enforcement in In re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed By Various 
Municipalities.131  
IV. PART III 
Over the years the Mount Laurel doctrine has been enforced both through a legislative 
scheme that sets up an executive agency which allows municipalities to decide how and where to 
permit construction of affordable housing within their boundaries, and a judicial scheme that for 
all intents and purposes allows courts to decide how and where affordable housing will be built 
within a municipality.  The difference between the two options is glaring. In the former, 
municipalities retain their autonomy and are allowed to plan best for the land uses that occur within 
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their borders.  In the latter, planning is nonexistent; the state’s end goal trumps the mechanics of 
achieving it. 
Unfortunately, forty years had passed and the underlying issues that led to Mount Laurel I 
remained.132 Yet, in the five years since Mount Laurel IV nearly three hundred and fifty towns 
have now reached settlements with fair-housing advocates, paving the way for thousands of new 
residences.133 Obviously, the judicial “builder’s remedy” has been more effective.  But this was 
really an emergency remedy, and the need for a holistic solution remains.  Indeed, the courts 
originally withdrew from the affordable-housing issue when the legislature stepped in, believing 
judicial leadership was no longer necessary, but political pressures stalled movement for nearly 
fifteen years, forcing the courts to take control once again. 
Massachusetts has taken an alternative approach, placing remediation of the affordable 
housing problem squarely in the hands of developers with their “Anti-Snob” Zoning Law, Chapter 
40B Sec. 21-23.134 Like Mount Laurel, Chapter 40B was also enacted in response to economic 
discrimination in housing.135 Chapter 40B allows developers to ignore local zoning in 
Massachusetts communities where less than 10 percent of housing is "affordable."136 It allows 
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developers in those towns to construct large-scale multifamily projects wherever they wish, 
provided that they dedicate twenty-five percent of the new units as affordable housing.137  
Much has been written regarding the history of the statute and the curious timing of the 
adoption by the Legislature in the wake of Boston’s “forced busing” and the racial crises that 
followed.138 Some have hailed the one-size-fits-all statute as an innovative success. 139 However, 
it makes no distinction among the state’s unique geologic or topographic regions or among the 
state’s cities, suburbs, or relatively rural towns, and that stands in contradiction to sound planning 
principles.140 That each and every community—both Boston and Lee, for instance—must attain 
the same standard fails to recognize that Boston (population approximately 685,094 in 2017) is 
different from Lee (population approximately 2051 in 2010).141 Furthermore, in practice, the 
statute “provides a developer with a blank check to build an unlimited number of dwelling units 
on a parcel of land zoned for a different use or for a density far different from that proposed.” 142 
Surely, 40B is market-driven, and most developers want to build where housing demand is high, 
and so while 40B has led the creation of significant affordable housing within the state, it will not 
likely be constructed in Massachusetts in any meaningful way. 
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Mount Laurel I made clear that the New Jersey Constitution requires each municipality to 
bear a reasonable portion of the state’s collective affordable housing burden. The record has shown 
that a task as controversial as affordable housing in New Jersey “cannot be handled effectively by 
a body subject to political pressures.”143 Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act provides a good, if 
not sad, example of a statute that has simply gone too far in asserting compliance with a state 
mandate.144 Until we live in a world of true equality, the judicial solution of Mount Laurel II and 
Mount Laurel IV remains the most effective response to economic discrimination in housing and 
therefore the best means to eradicate the remnants of de jure racial segregation in our New Jersey 
cities and suburbs.   
V. CONCLUSION 
At heart, New Jersey's fair-housing laws are not just about building homes. They are also 
about expanding ladders of opportunity to the middle class for the many thousands of families 
priced out of our state's many thriving communities.  The 45-year history of New Jersey's Mount 
Laurel doctrine illustrates the difficulty faced in addressing remediating past wrongs such as 
exclusionary zoning. When little had been accomplished in the eight years following the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey's landmark ruling in Mount Laurel I, the Court's Mount Laurel II ruling, by 
allowing a “builder's remedy” and assigning exclusionary zoning challenges to a hand -picked 
group of judges, effectively forced the legislature to act. The resulting Fair Housing Act, while 
controversial from its inception due to its allowing for Regional Contribution Agreements, 
established a workable administrative system for ensuring that local governments met their “fair 
share” affordable housing obligations. Over time, however, the Council on Affordable Housing 
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(COAH), unable to surmount technical problems and facing political and public opposition, proved 
incapable of meeting its obligations under the Fair Housing Act. Finally, in 2015, thirty years after 
the legislature had replaced court supervision of municipal “fair share” obligations with the 
COAH, the Court found it had no choice but to return the responsibility for overseeing compliance 
with the Fair Housing Act to the judiciary. Today, this economic segregation, further aggravated 
by gentrification and rising housing costs, has exacerbated the economic class divide.145 “We are 
today faced with a second form of hypersegregation, one based on income rather than race.” 146  
Fair and aggressive enforcement of our fair-housing laws provides real opportunities for tens of 
thousands of families. As far as we’ve come, there is still more we can do to ensure we take full 
advantage of this historic opportunity. Housing remains the major unfinished business of the civil 
rights movement. 147 
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